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Abstract
The article delves into Kazakhstan’s policies vis-à-vis the European Union, focusing on
their driving motives and enabling conditions. Drawing upon published papers and,
to a lesser degree, primary sources, the author argues that friendship with the EU
largely serves the Kazakhstani elite as means of economic modernisation as well
regime legitimation, perfectly fitting Kazakhstan’s dominant domestic discourse
which portrays the country as Eurasian and its foreign policy—as multi-vector. The
study also shows that Astana’s partnership with Brussels is to a large degree possible
because the EU holds a simultaneous positive attitude to such partnership regardless
Kazakhstan’s authoritarian regime. According to the article, such reflects the great
instrumental value collaboration with Astana gives Brussels, the EU’s general
inactivity on democracy promotion in Central Asia and Kazakhstan’s looking more
pro-European and economically/politically advanced against the background of its
post-Soviet and Central Asian autocratic fellows. The paper concludes by reflecting
on the configuration of pragmatism and identity in Astana’s approach to the EU and
discussing the peculiarities of the bloc’s power over Kazakhstan.
Keywords: Autocracy, Democracy promotion, European Union, Foreign policy,
Instrumentality, Kazakhstan, Power, Pragmatism, Russia
Introduction
In the post-Soviet space, and especially in the Central Asian region, the EU’s relations
with Kazakhstan stand out. To cite a few facts, Kazakhstan is the country where the
bloc in 1993 opened its first—which until 2010 was its only—delegation in Central
Asia. Moreover, Kazakhstan is the sole Central Asian state that participates in the
Bologna Process and has a second generation agreement with the bloc.1 Furthermore,
Kazakhstan is the region’s only state for which the EU is the main source of FDI and
the largest trade partner, accounting for more than a third of its foreign trade and over
a half of its FDIs (EU External Action, 2017).
To some, the topic of the Kazakhstani policies toward the EU may appear unoriginal,
since it has attracted some scholarly attention in recent years. Yet, this paper is peculiar
in its focus and scope. While other studies approach Astana-Brussels relations from
either a chronological (e.g. Anceschi, 2014; Kurmanguzhin, 2016) or a law perspective
(e.g. Kembayev, 2016) or focus on one single dimension of Kazakhstan-EU ties (e.g.
Bossuyt and Kubicek, 2015; Collins and Bekenova, 2017), this article concentrates on
driving motives behind Kazakhstan’s EU policies as well as factors attendant on their
and European Studies
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success. Importantly, under the assumption that the Kazakhstani elite’s policies toward
and perceptions of the EU—as well as vice versa—are part of their broader and coherent
understandings of their country’s place in the world, this study widely resorts to relevant
parallels for building and substantiating its arguments.
The paper primarily draws on a broad range of existing empirical studies on EU and
Kazakh foreign policies (including those published in Russian), aiming to perform their
systematic review in order to not only make their critical assessment, but also gain a
more complete picture on the topic. In terms of structure, the article consists of three
parts, successively discussing, first, the primary determinants of Astana’s foreign policy
in general, second, the driving motives of its behaviour toward the EU in particular,
and third, factors contributing to Brussels’ readiness to cooperate with Kazakhstan
regardless of its regime remaining authoritarian. The study concludes by pondering on
the role of pragmatism and identity in Kazakhstan’s EU policies as well as the strengths,
weaknesses and further dynamics of Brussels’ power over Astana.
Kazakhstan’s foreign policy: Fundamental motives
Even a brief look at primary sources and academic studies on Kazakhstan’s foreign
policy reveals its two primary characteristics, namely the prioritisation of economic
goals and propensity to multi-vectorism (that is, collaboration with all regional powers),
with the latter being consequential on the former. Both seem to emanate from the ob-
jective needs of Kazakhstan’s development as well as the personal ideas of the country’s
elite and, in the first place, its long-standing autocratic leader, Nursultan Nazarbayev.
Indeed, on the one hand, Kazakhstan’s location in the center of Eurasia predetermines
that the country would highly capitalise on the region’s possible reconnection (Kuchins
et al., 2015: p. 2). Moreover, being landlocked and situated distantly from the world’s
main communication channels makes it especially important for the country to have
friendly relations with its neighbours (Bolekbaeva and Selivanova, 2015: p. 210).
Concomitantly, what qualitatively distinguishes Kazakhstan from the other Central
Asian states is its leader’s strong personal dedication to the idea of economic modernisa-
tion, which dominates most of his speeches and addresses (Ambrosio and Lange, 2014),
epitomising itself in his argument that “an open economy and integration into the world’s
powerful economic zones is the only means of survival for a nation and a state”
(Nazarbayev, 1999, my translation). Nazarbayev’s simultaneous commitment to economic
modernisation and preservation of authoritarianism (discussed below) seems reminiscent
of the developmental patterns of contemporary China and the so-called “Asian tigers” in
the 1970–1990s. Incidentally, Nazarbayev himself contends he is influenced by the ideas
of Lee Kuan Yew (Vanderhill, 2017: p. 47), Singapore’s first prime minister who, for many,
symbolises authoritarian modernisation. Nazarbayev’s ideas are largely reflected in his pol-
icies which make him stand out among the region’s leaders: Jarosiewicz (2016: p. 29), for
example, considers him one of the few post-Soviet autocrats who tend to respond to a
growing external and domestic pressure by acceleration of economic reforms rather than
isolation and screw-tightening.2 Importantly, his economic reforms have resulted in a sub-
stantial growth of the middle class, reduction of poverty as well as increase in the average
income per capita and monthly wages (for details, see ibid.: p. 22). In general, as the com-
parative study of Central Asian states by Batsaikhan and Dabrowski (2017: pp. 8–19)
shows, Kazakhstan preforms best or second best among them across all economic and
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socio-economic indicators. This may substantially explain why Kazakhstan is one of the
few post-Soviet states, where most people feel positive about the Soviet Union’s break-up
(Jarosiewicz, 2016:: p. 21).
Nazarbayev’s economic motivations correlate well with his rejection of geopolitical
competition, in particular, the ongoing so-called “New Great Game” in Eurasia
(Konopelko, 2017: p. 3). In this vein, the Kazakhstani elite contest Putin’s efforts to
transform the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) from an economic to a political
integration group (Kuchins et al., 2015: p. 9; Jarosiewicz, 2016: p. 27; Konopelko, 2017:
p. 13; Patalakh, 2017: pp. 7–8). Simultaneously, Astana criticises US foreign policy for
prioritising security and political issues over economic ones, arguing that Washington’s
harsh stances on Russia and Iran are detrimental to Kazakhstan’s energy and
economic needs (Kuchins et al., 2015: p. 9): incidentally, Nazarbayev personally
decried the West’s economic sanctions on Russia, calling them “barbaric” for being
deleterious to Kazakhstan’s economy (RFE/RL, 2015).
Another peculiarity of Nazarbayev is positive thinking inherent in his speeches: in
this spirit, admitting the challenges in which Kazakhstan finds itself due to its
geographical situation, he still tends to present them as an opportunity rather than a
limit to the country’s development (Ambrosio and Lange, 2014: p. 546). Foreign policy
issues occupy, on average, 18.5% of Nazarbayev’s annual addresses, the share which is
comparable to Russian Presidents’ addresses in the noughties, however, unlike them,
Nazarbayev’s are primarily devoted to economic issues (ibid: pp. 541–542). Rather than
criticising any state’s developmental model, Nazarbayev prefers speaking of comparative
advantages which characterise each of them and which Kazakhstan, according to him,
needs to integrate (ibid: p. 546). Apart from the obvious security motivation to keep
good neighbourly relations with its two biggest neighbours, Russia and China (ibid:
p. 549), Astana’s approach toward them is largely driven by economic reasons. In a
nutshell, Kazakhstan’s interest in China is determined by, first, its developmental
model, commonly attractive for autocracies, second, China’s rapidly growing
economy which provides a fruitful ground to the enhancement of mutual trade,
and third, China’s growing investments in the Kazakh economy—in the first place,
infrastructure projects, the main of which is “The Silk Road Economic Belt” (Hug
& Zhang, 2010: pp. 6–7; Konopelko, 2017: p. 3). Importantly, all these also repre-
sent China’s advantages over Russia, which further reinforces Astana’s desire to
collaborate with Beijing (Koch, 2013: p. 114). As for cooperation with Russia,
Kazakhstan is chiefly motivated by the aspiration to find new markets (Nurgaliyeva,
2016: p. 95) and draw long-term benefits from the mutual economic integration
(Kuchins et al., 2015: p. 9),3 the results of which, however, have been rather pes-
simistic thus far for Astana: not only has Kazakhstan’s trade volume with the
EAEU’s members declined (Eurasian Economic Commission, 2017: p. 18), but also
the Russia-West sanctions war and the Russian rouble’s steep depreciation has
pulled down the EAEU’s other members, including Kazakhstan.
To justify the multi-vectorness, Nazarbayev bases his foreign policy on the ideology
of Eurasianism,4 which, in his own words, presupposes that “our [Kazakhstan’s] model
for development will not resemble other countries; it will include in itself the achieve-
ments from different civilizations” (quoted in Engvall and Cornell, 2015: p. 69). One of
the main components of his Eurasianism is a Eurasian Union, an integration group
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encompassing the former Soviet Union’s states, the idea of which Nazarbayev expressed
for the first time in 1994. As becomes clear from the analysis of his articles and
speeches, his understanding of the union’s basic principles has been practically invari-
able over time. Indeed, in 1994, 2004 and 2011, Nazarbayev methodically suggested
that the then-future integration group should be grounded on economic pragmatism,
voluntary membership, equality of its members and taking cognizance of differences in
their developmental levels (Mostafa, 2013: pp. 164–165; Nurgaliyeva, 2016: p. 95).
Unlike the Russian version of Eurasianism, which has a neo-imperial, anti-Western and
anti-globalisation character (Mostafa, 2013: pp. 161–163), Nazarbayev’s is formulated
in a positive manner (i.e. from the in-favour-of rather than against perspective) and
centres around economic integration, chiefly omitting the issues of ideology and
security (ibid: 167; Nurgaliyeva, 2016: p. 97). In this vein, aiming to better engage
Kazakhstan in international economic relations, he contends the integration group
should, first, function as a platform for interregional cooperation (Mostafa, 2013: p. 165;
Konopelko, 2017: p. 14) and second, be open for other states, among which he mentioned,
in particular, Western countries (Nurgaliyeva, 2016: p. 97) and Turkey (Kuchins et al.,
2015: p. 21). Primacy of economic considerations manifests itself in Nazarbayev’s policies
in the EAEU. For example, Nazarbayev advocates a careful approach to the pace of
integration and the acceptance of new members, which is in a particularly marked
contrast to geopolitically inclined Putin’s Russia that calls for acceleration of
integration and pulls other states into the union with little heed of the potential
economic consequences of such moves (Patalakh, 2017: p. 7). Remarkably, whereas
in Russia, Eurasianism is mostly a domain of—conservative and often marginal—in-
tellectuals and is employed by the government only on ad hoc basis (Mostafa,
2013: pp. 161–163), in Kazakhstan, Eurasianism is not only an essential element
accompanying various areas of the country’s social and political life (for numerous
examples, see Mostafa, 2013: p. 166), but also seems to be seated relatively deeply
in people’s minds and not dismissed as ideological bunkum. To illustrate, Kuchins
et al. (2015: p. 3), having interviewed numerous Kazakh experts and officials, note
that it is their common trait to identify their country as Eurasian.
Some studies (e.g. Engvall and Cornell, 2015; Jarosiewicz, 2016; Nurgaliyeva, 2016),
however, appear to view the Russia factor as most critical in Kazakhstani foreign policy,
sometimes going as far as reducing the entire policy of balancing to Nazarbayev’s desire
to ensure protection from Russia’s possible aggression. Consider, for example, the
following excerpts.
Kazakhstan’s expanding partnership with China has been imperative for reducing its
dependence on Russia (Engvall and Cornell, 2015: 68).
To reduce the dependency on Russia, Nazarbayev worked to create a favorable
environment for foreign investors (Nurgaliyeva, 2016: p. 97).
Reforms are Kazakhstan’s way of protecting itself from plunging into the zone
of Moscow’s civilisational, political and economic influence, from economic
stagnation and the feudal socio-political order seen in Azerbaijan
(Jarosiewicz 2016: p. 7).
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Economic cooperation with China, Russia’s important economic partner, is intended
to mitigate Moscow’s aspirations in Central Asia, but also to boost the country’s
economic development (ibid: pp. 48-49).
At one level, accounts of this sort seem to possess a grain of truth: indeed, a number
of empirical studies point to the Kazakhstani elite’s growing considerations of
sovereignty in light of Russia’s coercive energy measures in the 1990s (Koch, 2013: pp.
112–113) as well as some concern they have about Russia’s aggression in Ukraine
(Kuchins et al., 2015: p. 10) and Kazakhstan’s overdependence on Russia (Koch, 2013:
p. 114). Moreover, Nazarbayev himself tends to praise China for pursuing a policy that
is “aimed against hegemonism” (quoted in Engvall and Cornell, 2015: p. 68), which
could be plausibly interpreted as criticism of Russian neo-imperialism. Also, especially
in recent years, he has undertaken a number of—mostly symbolic, but still—steps
arguably designed to reduce Russia’s ideological influence in Kazakhstan and prevent
Russian separatism in its northern regions (for details, see Holmquist, 2015: p. 2;
Roberts, 2015: p. 5; Jarosiewicz, 2016: pp. 41–43).
Nonetheless, viewing this motive as primary would seemingly mean placing an over-
emphasis on its significance in Astana’s foreign policy which, in fact, would apparently
be of little difference had Russia no neo-imperial ambitions. First, such accounts
underestimate the important role of the considerations of economic development and
modernisation, deeply rooted in Nazarbayev’s thinking, as well as the EU’s (discussed
below) and China’s high instrumental value for these goals. Second, as some scholars
rightly point out, in Central Asia, the EU does not possess—and does not even try to
possess—hard power capabilities comparable to those of Russia (e.g. Kuchins et al.,
2015; Konopelko, 2017). Hence, for Astana, closer ties with the bloc may hardly serve
as a workable counterbalance against Moscow, especially considering that in 2014,
the bloc failed to protect even Ukraine, a country whose ties with the EU are far
closer than those of Kazakhstan. Third, should reducing Moscow’s leverage be Nazar-
bayev’s primary motive, he would not have likely entered the Russia-led Customs
Union and its successor, the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), thus dramatically
heightening its level of dependence on Russia—all the more so given that the
Customs Union was initiated in 2009, a year after the Russian aggression in Georgia,
and the treaty on the EAEU was signed in May 2014, at the peak of the Russo-
Ukrainian conflict. Fourth, in case of a revolt, Putin is perhaps the only one that may
try to save Nazarbayev’s regime, similarly to how he acts in Syria. In view of this, it
comes as no surprise that the two countries enhanced their cooperation in 2011,
against the backdrop of the Arab Spring and intensifying protests in Russia (Engvall
and Cornell, 2015: pp. 69–70).5 Fifth, Moscow hardly appears in a position to repeat
the Crimean scenario in Northern Kazakhstan: as empirical analysis shows, potential
pro-Russian irredentism in that region, while not impossible, is still limited (Diener,
2015), which starkly contrasts with the pre-2014 Crimea, where separatist notions,
already strong, were being further inflamed by the Kremlin’s activities (Roslycky,
2011). Last, in light of the growing discontent among ordinary Kazakhs about China’s
increasing influence in their country, coupled with their generally positive view of
Russia (Koch, 2013), Astana’s friendship with Moscow seems itself to be a balancing
act with regard to Beijing.
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Consequently, it appears fairer to deem Russia as a factor limiting Kazakhstan’s
foreign policy options rather than determining them. This point can be illustrated on
Kazakhstan’s foreign policy freedom in security sphere which Ambrosio and Lange
(2014: p. 550) describe as “more aspirational than practical”. For one thing, Astana
refrains from getting involved in any form of military collaboration with Beijing for
such may engender a harsh reply from Moscow (ibid). In a similar vein, Kazakhstan’s
cooperation with NATO, although substantial compared to those of the Central Asian
states, is still limited, in large part because Nazarbayev realises the alliance will
never have the same influence in the region as Moscow (Kuchins et al., 2015: pp.
17–19) and hence, for him, the possible danger this cooperation produces exceeds
the benefit it gives.
Kazakhstan’s approach to the EU: Key determinants
Kazakhstan’s approach to the EU can be probably best summarised by the word
“instrumentality” which for the Kazakhstani regime is apparent in two aspects. The first
of them is the bloc’s perceived competence, that is, the available knowledge, technolo-
gies and investment which Nazarbayev needs for Kazakhstan’s economic development
and modernisation. Importantly, the EU’s competence manifests itself both against the
absolute standard as well as compared to the other regional powers: Koch (2013: p.
112), for instance, notes that “the strategy of encouraging Western involvement in the
resource economy [was] a response to concrete economic conditions in the early
1990s, and the fact that Russia lacked sufficient financial capacity and technology to de-
velop Kazakhstan’s immense oil resources”.6 Indeed, the idea of the EU being advanced
and competent is pronounced in Kazakhstan’s official discourse with Nazarbayev else-
where citing the need to utilise European experience in various areas, such as judicial
system (Vremya, 2017), education (Tengri News, 2014), EAEU integration (Forum,
2014) etc. Perhaps the most vivid example in this regard is the 2009–2011 “Path to
Europe” national program which Nazarbayev personally initiated to enhance all-round
cooperation between the EU and Kazakhstan and use “positive European experience”
across multiple spheres (President of Kazakhstan, 2008). Europe and the West top the
list of the regions which Nazarbayev mentions in his addresses, with the majority of
those references dealing with the economic sphere and being dedicated to such inter-
national organisations as the EU, the OSCE and the EBRD (Ambrosio and Lange, 2014:
p. 543). Also, Astana resorts to the help of Western consultants to conduct economics
reforms: since 2011, for example, one of them has been “Tony Blair Associates”, a
company owned by former British Prime Minister.7
Consistent with the competence argument is also the fact that Astana appears to
need partnership with Brussels more than vice versa. Analysing EU-Kazakhstan
relations in the two recent decades, Kurmanguzhin (2016: pp. 107–114) shows that it is
Astana that has primarily been pushing them forward, suggesting initiatives that were
often ahead of the bloc’s the then approaches to cooperation with Central Asia. More-
over, a closer look at Astana’s major initiatives, made in 2000, 2006, but especially in
2009–2014, during the work on EPCA, makes it clear that their focus was on the long-
term investment, economic and energy collaboration (2015: pp. 36–40; 2016: p. 107,
109). Some propositions also regarded political cooperation and democratisation, yet
those were rather of auxiliary character and furthermore, Nazarbayev’s sincerity in their
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regard may be generally called into question given his reluctance to carry out any
substantial political reforms in Kazakhstan (see below).
Notably, instrumental competence seems to determine Astana’s approach toward the
West in general, of which the EU is—perhaps the most illustrative, but stil—only a
particular instance. To illustrate, elaborating on Kazakhstan’s aspiration to cooperate
with its second largest FDI source, the US, one interview-based qualitative study points
out that
Kazakh elites emphasize that the United States possesses competitive advantages
in technology, business and legal best practices, institutions, and overall values
that, if applied in the region, would be beneficial to its long-term development
(Kuchins et al., 2015: p. 18).
Also, in contradistinction to the other Central Asian countries, whose
collaborations with NATO are constrained to the Partnership for Peace program,
Kazakhstan also participates in the alliance’s Planning and Review Process and
has agreed NATO’s Individual Partnership Action Plan and Partnership Action
Plan against Terrorism. Despite certain negative outcomes that partnership may
bring about, given Kazakhstan’s membership in the Russia-led Collective Security
Treaty Organisation (see Shaymergenov and Biekenov, 2010: pp. 37-38, 47), the
country still engages itself in NATO’s initiatives, viewing them as a way to train
and modernise its national army in accordance with the best world standards
and enhance its prestige through participation in international peacekeeping
operations (for details, see ibid: pp. 39-44).
The second dimension of the EU’s instrumentality relates to Nazarbayev’s wide
image-promotion campaign which serves him not only to attract investments, but
also, importantly, to legitimise his regime.8 For this goal, the usefulness of the
West in general and the EU in particular is determined by the fact that they seem
to symbolise, in Nazarbayev’s view, progress and modernity. In this respect, even
his positioning of Kazakhstan as a Eurasian rather than a Central Asian state
should be most likely interpreted through such lenses. In this respect, in 2014,
Nazarbayev went even further, suggesting to rename Kazakhstan to “Kazak Eli” to
get rid of the “stan” suffix that, according to him, makes the country poorly
distinguishable from its neighbours, pushing off tourists and investors (BBC News,
2014).9 To promote the image of Kazakhstan as a forward-thinking country, in
recent years, the Nazarbayev regime has been especially active in hosting big
international events, such as the 2011 Asian Winter Games, EXPO-2017 etc.
Importantly, from the Kazakhstani elite’s pegrirspective, such events appear to
serve, in the first place, the goal of image-enhancement, aiming at economic devel-
opment only to a lesser extent. Indeed, as Nurmakov (2016: 121–123) shows, the
messages accompanying those events represent the goals and the will of the ruling
class with little consideration of the public’s desires, mostly addressing foreign
governments and investors and not tourists, as officially claimed by the govern-
ment. Moreover, most of such events take place in the country’s most developed
cities, making little, if any, contribution to bridging the gap in regional disparities.
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Also, Kazakhstan widely uses its membership in international (primarily, Western)
fora for the purposes of nation-branding10 and regime legitimation—or, put another
way, “[t]he legitimacy of the Nazarbayev regime, in the post-2007 years, became, inter
alia, the function of the degree to which Kazakhstan is formally engaged with
Western-sponsored initiatives related to the human dimension” (Anceschi, 2014: p. 17).
For example, researchers commonly note that Kazakhstan has largely portrayed its
2010 OSCE Chairmanship as the evidence of the country’s being a reliable member of
the international community. Yet, again, as scholars widely argue, albeit the chairman-
ship was coupled with political and human rights reforms within the framework of the
2009–2012 National Human Rights Action Plan, they turned out to be mostly cosmetic,
failing to make real improvements (Hug and Zhang, 2010: p. 10; Engvall and Cornell,
2015: 44–47; Tsertsvadze and Axyonova, 2013: 1; Bossuyt and Kubicek, 2015: pp. 186–
187; Kuchins et al., 2015: p. 20). This discussion brings us to the need to take a closer
look at the EU’ perception of Kazakhstan, which is done below.
Kazakhstani political regime and Brussels’ approach to Astana
According to Kembayev (2016: p. 202), Kazakhstan’s poor record on democracy and
human rights is the primary factor which hinders the deepening of the Brussels-Astana
relations. As he puts it, the mutual dialogue in this field, unlike in the security area,
“cannot be qualified as harmonious” (ibid: p. 194), given that the EU continuously has
concerns in this regard (ibid). Yet, this notwithstanding, the overall approach of the
bloc toward Astana remains positive11: indeed, despite an autocratic regime, the EU
conceives of Kazakhstan, in the words of Kavalski and Cho (2017: p. 6), as “[a] poten-
tially promising pupil[]” in the Central Asian region (along with Kyrgyzstan).
Researchers largely note that the bloc’s officials commonly appreciate Kazakhstan’s am-
bitiousness, influentiality and predictability (Bolekbaeva and Selivanova, 2015: p. 226),
calling the country the region’s “anchor of stability” (Kuchins et al., 2015: p. 21) and
prizing its reliability as an energy partner (Konopelko, 2017: p. 7). Remarkably, in 2014,
at the peak of the Ukrainian crisis, when Putin’s Russia was being highly isolated, Euro-
pean leaders and high-ranked officials—for instance, François Hollande and German
Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier—paid official visits to Kazakhstan to discuss,
first, their countries’ own cooperation with Kazakhstan, in particular in the energy and
infrastructure areas, and second, the possibility of Astana serving as a possible host of
Russian-Ukraine peace talks, the plan which, however, was never actualised, for all
rounds of those talks eventually took place in Minsk instead (Engvall and Cornell,
2015: 70; Kuchins et al., 2015: p. 21).12
What has contributed to the EU’s overall positive attitude to cooperation with
Kazakhstan? The first reason seemingly consists in the country’s progressiveness
relative to its Central Asian fellows. More precisely, Kazakhstan appears to be the sole
stable well-to-do Central Asian country with an open foreign policy: indeed, while
Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan are too poor, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan are too with-
drawn and inclined not to follow the rules of the game (Dave, 2007: p. 4; Kuzmina
2014: p. 5). Furthermore, notwithstanding a poor democracy record in absolute terms,
Kazakhstan is the region’s second most democratic country after Kyrgyzstan (EIU,
2017), thanks to which the EU, guided by the principle of “not put[ting] all Central
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Asian countries within the same authoritarian basket” (Anceschi, 2014: p. 16),
tends to somewhat close its eyes on electoral fraud in that country.
The second factor deals with the behaviour of Kazakhstan itself, which set it apart
from the other post-Soviet autocracies. On this point, Nazarbayev is emblematic of
what Hug (2009: p. 3) calls “smart authoritarianism”, i.e. utilising pronouncedly temperate
methods to stay in power, “not boiling his opponents, but using the levers of power to
more subtly suppress dissent”. Indeed, the comprehensive analysis done by Vanderhill
(2017: pp. 46–48) shows that, in contrast with some of his fellow autocrats, Nazarbayev
tends to justify his right to rule by real socioeconomic results rather than pure repressive
measures, use comparatively lenient ways to block access to information (e.g. in
Kazakhstan, foreign websites do not get blocked and local ones get restricted only
sometimes), allow foreign NGOs to work in the country and fund national NGOs.
Also, Kazakhstan somewhat resists adopting Russian-like restrictions on civil
society, especially when it comes to the issues salient for Western audience. In this
vein, the Nazarbayev administration avoids supporting the harsh stance on gay
rights promoted by Russia, both at home and internationally (for examples, see
Patalakh, 2017: pp. 6–7). In other instances, Kazakhstan passes softer versions of
Russian regulations: such is the case with the recent Kazakhstani law on NGOs
which places certain restrictions on them, but, unlike a similar Russian law, does
not oblige NGOs receiving international funding to get registered as “foreign
agents”, an expression meaning “spies” in Russian (EurasiaNet, 2015).
Kazakh political scientist Rustem Kurmanguzhin (2016: p. 110) argues that the
Kazakhstani government considers democratisation as a long-term goal which should
be attained gradually and where external intervention is counterproductive. He also
points to the fact that Kazakhstan’s 2009–2011 “Path to Europe” program contained
reforms in the country’s electoral legislation, thanks to which, inter alia, the national
parliament was transformed into a multi-party one (ibid: p. 113). Yet, arguments of this
sort should apparently be regarded with a grain of salt, bearing in mind that in recent
years, as international rankings show, Kazakhstan has become even more authoritarian.
For instance, in Democracy Index, the country’s score decreased from 3.30 (132nd rank)
in 2010 to 3.06 (139th rank) in 2016 (EIU, 2010: p. 7; 2017: p. 10), its Freedom score
worsened from 5.5/7 in 2010 to 6/7 in 2017 (Freedom House 2010a, 2017a) and its
press freedom score deteriorated from 78/100 in 2010 to 85/100 in 2017 (Freedom
House 2010b, 2017b). Moreover, many of those policies are likely to have been part of
Nazarbayev’s PR campaign. Such is, for instance, the case with the “Path to Europe”
program, the adoption of which was overtly linked to Kazakhstan’s upcoming OSCE
chairmanship (President of Kazakhstan, 2008). Remarkably, the program included a
humanitarian dimension, yet, hardly considering it a priority: not only it was listed last,
but also, while officially it was aiming to develop the social partnership institution,
tolerance and liberal attitude toward other religions as well as use European experience
in gender policy (ibid), in fact, in implementing those provisions, the government
confined itself solely to organisation of four conferences and attraction of volunteering
organisations from Europe to develop the institution of volunteering in Kazakhstan
(Government of Kazakhstan, 2008). This program seems to illustrate Nazarbayev’s
general approach to human rights initiatives, with regard to which, as one interview-
based study notes,
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the Kazakh authorities’ working agenda is punctuated by . . . ‘strategic deadlines’.
Those coincide with major bilateral events such as high-level conferences or review
meetings. Once a conference or a meeting of this type is over, the implementation
and follow-up of agreed-upon activities tends to be put on hold or slows down
fundamentally because of bureaucratic obstructionism and the lack of political will
(Voloshin, 2014: p. 48).
Therefore, more compelling is the argument of Dave (2007: p. 6) that deems
Nazarbayev’s political reforms as instrumental, directly linking them to the West’s
pressure and noting that they have mainly led to the regime’s further strengthening
thus far despite that they have laid some foundation for a possible democratisation
in the future. Hence, it is open to debates whether Nazarbayev’s devotion to mod-
ernisation in general should necessarily be regarded as a sign of lofty ideals, given
that, despite the innumerability and magnitude of his reforms (for their overview,
see Jarosiewicz, 2016: pp. 30–32, 45), they hardly touch his personal leadership. In
view of this, some authors suggest that Nazarbayev and his elite need economic
reforms because economy is the source of their own enrichment as well as the
foundation of the legitimacy of their rule, noting that the Kazakhstani regime is
based on an unwritten “social contract” which implies that society stays silent on
the authoritarian regime, getting in return peace, stability and relatively high income
(Koch, 2013: p. 115; Jarosiewicz, 2016: pp. 23–24).
The “smartness” of Nazarbayev’s authoritarianism is especially striking in Kazakhstan’s
approach to the EU, especially if viewed in comparison with the other post-Soviet autocra-
cies. For instance, the country’s high officials actively work with the Western audience by
publishing in international magazines articles arguing that Kazakhstan is a demo-
cratic state (e.g. Idrissov, 2011) and proudly highlighting Astana’s accomplishments
in establishing close economic ties with the EU (e.g. Nazarbayev, 2014). More im-
portantly, instead of resolutely rejecting EU suggestions on human rights, like other
post-Soviet autocracies tend to do, Kazakhstan tends to treat them with conspicu-
ous consideration and politeness. In 2011, for example, EU and US criticism in-
duced Nazarbayev to refrain from holding a referendum on the prolongation of his
presidential term till 2020. Later, answering to remarks about violations at the
2011 presidential elections, Astana promised to make improvements, a behaviour
which at that time was in a stark contrast to the overtly falsified 2010 Belarusian
elections and violently stifled protests after them (Sivokin, 2011). In general, when
accused of human rights violations, Astana tends to politely reply in a manner
that—at least to some extent—recognises democracy and human rights as values,
acknowledges Kazakhstan’s underdevelopment in this regard compared to the West,
and accepts the need to improve. At worst, Nazarbayev, similarly to other post-
Soviet leaders, asks to respect Kazakhstan’s internal traditions, but still using a
polite language. In July 2013, for instance, he responded to a British journalist as
follows: “We are grateful to you for the advice, but no one has the right to instruct
us as to how to live and how to build our country” (Savchenko, 2015). In other
cases, Nazarbayev endeavours to shift the attention from Kazakhstan’s weakness to-
ward its achievements: in this vein, in March 2016, Nazarbayev gave the following
reply to Jean-Claude Junker’s remark about human rights in Kazakhstan:
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[The EU] is a very important, both economic and political, partner [of Kazakhstan];
therefore, we take very positively all friendly advice of my friend, Mr Junker,
regarding the political situation [in Kazakhstan] and so forth. I am grateful to you for
congratulating me on last year’s elections and this year’s parliamentary elections,
when observers from 60 countries, who amounted to over a thousand, said our
elections are held on the full basis of democracy, freedom, competition and
adherence to all the laws which are necessary in such cases (Radio Azattyq,
2016, my translation).
To draw a parallel, in such cases, Putin widely resorts to blaming the West for double
standards (for details, see Headley, 2015),13 while Belarusian President Alexander Luka-
shenko tends to have recourse to overt insults: to exemplify, in 2011, when the then
President of the European Commission José Manuel Barroso accused him of human
rights abuse, Lukashenko gave the following comment:
On the subjects of bastards like Barroso and others - who is Barroso anyway? There
was a Barroso in Portugal. But they kicked him out and put him to work in the
European Commission. The last thing I want to know about European officials is
who said this or that. There are thousands of them. They're all crooks. So I don't
want to talk about any Barrosos or other bastards like that (Rettman, 2011).
Furthermore, Astana agrees to participate in the EU’s human rights dialogues (HRDs)
which, according to (Anceschi, 2014: p. 16), go far smoother than the bloc’s HRDs with,
for instance, Turkmenistan. Likewise, in 2011, Kazakhstan agreed to take part in the
2011 Civil Society Seminar in Almaty, where the other Central Asian delegations de-
clined to take part (ibid: p. 17). However, again, the Nazarbayev regime’s participation
in the HRDs should be viewed in terms of its aforementioned desire to seek legitim-
ation rather than democratise. In this vein, Anceschi (ibid: p. 16) notes that Astana
tends to—quite successfully—marginalise the most disputable matters at HRDs. Simi-
larly, as the analysis of the agenda of Kazakhstan’s 2010 OSCE chairmanship shows, the
regime managed to shift the focus from democracy and human rights in their liberal
sense to the issues of security, environmental security, interethnic and interreligious re-
lations, illegal labour migration etc. (Faizova, 2011). In their analysis of how the
Kazakhstani and EU elites depict each other, Ospanova et al. (2017: p. 79) point to a
general difference in the areas the two sides accentuate: while Kazakhstani politicians
mainly concentrate on bilateral economic and energy ties, the EPCA and the facilitation
of the visa regime, largely underlining their country’s role in improving the bilateral col-
laboration, EU officials focus more on Kazakhstan’s reforms of the rule of law and re-
gional governance, making no mention of visa regime simplification. In like manner,
while describing the EU, the Kazakhstani elites primarily highlight its achievements on
the integration path, in building a single market and reaching a high status in the world
economy, whereas European officials tend to put the emphasis on the value-based na-
ture of the bloc (ibid: pp. 79–80). Declining international organisations’ human rights
reports as allegedly biased and imposing Western standards, Astana resorts to creating
national commissions which take an “alternative perspective” of democracy and human
rights to defend the regime (Savchenko, 2015). Such is largely in accord with
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Nazarbayev’s alternative narrative on democracy which, following the summary of Van-
derhill (2017: 47), rests on
1) arguing that liberalism or democracy must be a gradual, evolutionary
development in Kazakhstan and that political stability is more important than
immediate reform; 2) using the language of democracy to describe the political
regime in Kazakhstan; 3) claiming that the process of democratization in other
countries has resulted in violence, instability, and economic hardship; 4) arguing that
external involvement or pressure is inappropriate and not conducive for democracy.
Even a brief look at this alternative narrative reveals certain contradictions between
its elements, which seems to mean that the Kazakh regime has little intention to
present any coherent replacement of the common understanding of democracy, but
rather, aims to exploit any appropriate argument to halt it. This notwithstanding, as
opinion polls show, the Kazakhstani public at large mostly accept—or at least report
the acceptance of—this official narrative, believing that their country is democratic (or
moving toward democracy) and needs a strong leader (see ibid.: p. 49 for details).
Similar contradictions are evident in Kazakhstan’s approach toward Europe as well. On
the one hand, Nazarbayev generally follows the international community’s rules of the
game, uses Kazakhstan’s OSCE chairmanship and friendship with the EU for his own
PR and tries to convince Europe of his regime’s being democratic, On the other, he
sometimes rejects democratisation attempts, labelling them as pressure and interven-
tion, as reflected in statements like “[w]e have seen attempts to use instruments such
as observer missions during national elections to apply pressure by one group of
countries on another” (quoted in ibid.: p. 48). To give a similar example, in 2011,
Astana threatened to designate persona non grata one European parliamentarian that
had visited the city of Zhanaozen after the massacre (Anceschi, 2014: p. 15; see endnote
2 for further details on the Zhanaozen massacre).
The third factor relates to the EU’s perception of and interest in Kazakhstan. One
significant aspect of this factor is the relative unimportance of Kazakhstan for the bloc,
which is a manifestation of the EU’s general treatment of Central Asia,14 the region that
Kavalski and Cho describe as “[a] ghost[] in the vacuum of the EU’s external affairs”
(2017: p. 3) and “merely a bridge (if not—quite literally—a mere refueling station)
between the EU’s other and strategically more important commitments” (ibid: p. 4). On
the one hand, such may appear puzzling, given that the EU—unlike the US, Russia and
China—possesses a well-defined long-term formal strategy which delineates its prior-
ities in Central Asia. Yet, because of the region’s distance from the EU, both in
geographical and political terms—in the 1990s, Brussels remarkably perceived it as a
Russian sphere of influence—as well as integration-related problems inside the bloc
and problematic interstate relations in Central Asia, the bloc’s policies in that region tend
to be, as Kavalski and Cho put it, “lack[ing] focus” and “largely reactive” (ibid: p. 4; see also
Kuzmina, 2014: p. 4). A good manifestation of this point is that fact that the EU
elaborated a common strategy toward the region only in 2007, sixteen years after the
Soviet Union’s break-up.15 The Strategy’s adoption itself was, as phrased by Voloshin
(2014: pp. 43–44), “a concerted attempt to recalibrate the EU’s ties on a modified basis
where realism and idealism no longer contradict each other”. Such reflects the bloc’s
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failure to view democracy promotion in Central Asia as its moral duty (Kavalski and Cho,
2017: p. 4)—all the more so because its current priority in this respect is the Western
Balkans (ibid: p. 10)16 and because EU members generally feel Central Asia lacks breading
ground for democratisation (Bossuyt, 2016). In this light, it comes as no surprise that the
EU allocates relatively scarce resources on the region’s democratisation (Voloshin, 2014:
p. 45), the mission of the EU’s Special Representative for Central Asia is, as Kavalski and
Cho (2017: p. 10) put it, “understaffed and underfunded” and in general, the bloc mostly
opts to deal with the region “together [through] coordination among international struc-
tures” (quoted in ibid).17 Also, with respect to various EU documents on Central Asia,
such as the 2007 Strategy and Indicative Programme, the 1999 PCA, the new EPCA etc.,
researchers widely point out that they mostly contain general phrases, being vague on spe-
cific actions concerning democracy and human rights and failing to clarify conditions
linking EU assistance to compliance with democratic norms (Hug and Zhang, 2010: p. 4;
Tsertsvadze and Axyonova, 2013: p. 2; Voloshin, 2014: p. 46; Bossuyt and Kubicek, 2015:
p. 178). Interestingly, that the EU treats Central Asia as a region of secondary significance
seems to epitomise a larger trend, beneficial for the Nazarbayev regime. Indeed, while
China and Russia are mainly involved in a rivalry with the West in East/Southeast Asia
and Eastern Europe correspondingly, Kazakhstan finds itself in an opportune position of a
country with which major powers want to collaborate, simultaneously paying relatively lit-
tle attention to it.
Of higher salience, however, seems another aspect, namely the EU’s instrumental
need of Kazakhstan. Indeed, scholars widely use the word “pragmatic” to describe not only
Astana’s approach toward Brussels, but also Brussels’ interest in Astana. Gubaidullina
(2001: p. 36), for instance, defines the two approaches as “attendant pragmatism” and
“liberal pragmatism” respectively, while Anceschi (2014: p. 21) goes even further, referring
to the entire EU-Kazakhstani ties as “a tyranny of pragmatism” (for similar accounts, see
Malysheva, 2010), noting that it is energy issues that are at the core of bilateral agenda
while values and democracy are of marginal importance (ibid: p. 16). Some researchers
(e.g. Akkazieva, 2012: p. 220; Kuzmina, 2014: p. 5; Voloshin, 2014: p. 55) note that the
bloc’s main interest—in Turkmenistan as well as Kazakhstan—lies in the energy sphere, in
line with the diversification of its energy supply: with these two states, the EU signed
Memoranda of Understanding regarding energy issues as early as in 2006 and 2008 re-
spectively.18 Of some importance for the EU are also infrastructure, given that routes for
the growing EU-China trade run through Central Asia, and security sphere, for Brussels
deems Central Asia as, first, a transit corridor for the smuggling of narcotics from
Afghanistan and, second, a region where political destabilisation may produce terrorism
and extremism (Akkazieva, 2012: p. 220).
To enhance their attractiveness as investment recipients, the EU seeks to advance
Central Asian states’ financial stability and economic reforms as well as their further
integration in the world economic and financial systems (Kuzmina, 2014: p. 7). Accord-
ingly, in its policies toward Central Asia, the bloc, as the indicative programmes of its
Development Cooperation Instrument suggest (European Commission, 2007, 2011,
2014), primarily concentrates on the furtherance of regional collaboration and good
neighbourly relations, improvement of living standards and lessening of poverty as well
as energy, environmental and water projects. Incidentally, the 2007 Strategy also men-
tions human rights and democratisation as dimensions of the EU’s activities, but they
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are coupled with good governance (Council of the EU, 2007: pp. 7–9), to which the EU,
as some researchers argue, tends to give priority. Meden (2012: p. 59), for instance,
points out that Brussels is shifting its focus from democracy promotion to fight against
corruption, on paper, however, continuing to demand democratisation. Likewise,
(Bossuyt and Kubicek, 2015: p. 178) note that the budget of the European Instrument
for Democracy and Human Rights for Central Asia is relatively scarce and within the
framework of the Development Cooperation Instrument, 60–90% of aid is devoted to
poverty reduction, economic reforms and good governance.
Hence, prioritisation of stability over human rights19 reflects the bloc’s overall atti-
tude to the entire region, yet, this particularly manifests itself in relation to instrumen-
tally important states. In this spirit, in 2008–2009, the EU removed all economic
sanctions from Uzbekistan, even though its regime had hardly shown any improvements
in its treatment of human rights following the violent suppression of protests in Andijan
in 2005. Commentators largely interpreted that decision pointing to Uzbekistan’s
significance as the host of a German military base and a potential gas supplier for the
Trans-Caspian gas pipeline, the idea of which the bloc was being actively promoting at
that time (Malysheva, 2010: pp. 31–32; Voloshin, 2014: p. 49). By the same token, the
study of (Bossuyt and Kubicek 2015) contends that in Kyrgyzstan, the EU is comparatively
more active on advancing liberal democracy than in Kazakhstan, where the bloc primarily
promotes conditions which may lay the long-term foundation for it, such as administra-
tive capacity of the state: hence, instead of increasing pressure and demands on Nazar-
bayev, Brussels prefers cooperating with him on the issues he welcomes. Among the
reasons for this difference, the authors mention Kazakhstan’s importance relative to
resource-poor Kyrgyzstan, the fact that the Kyrgyz government asks for some help in
democratisation whereas Astana rejects it as well as the fact that a possible instability in
Kazakhstan may have more negative consequences for the region than instability in
Kyrgyzstan (ibid).
Concluding remarks
The study has shown that Kazakhstan’s cooperation aspirations vis-à-vis the EU are
largely dictated by instrumental considerations of economic modernisation and regime
legitimation, corresponding to the general multi-vectorism of its foreign policy. More-
over, the success of Nazarbayev’s EU policies is possible to a great extent thanks to
Brussels’ concomitant positive stand on friendship with Astana, which stems not only
from the relatively high instrumental value of Kazakhstan for the bloc and its generally pas-
sive approach to democracy promotion in Central Asia, but also because of Kazakhstan’s
being more progressive and pro-European in comparison with the region’s other states.
This argument is in line with (Anceschi, 2014: p. 21) conclusion that “pragmatism
may be viewed as the essential glue of the entire relationship between the Euro-
pean Union and Kazakhstan”, a statement which, however, seems to necessitate fur-
ther specification, for the very assertion that Astana pursues a pragmatic foreign
policy20 may be interpreted in multiple ways. Indeed, depending on an IR study,
the notion of pragmatism may pertain either to an actor’s preferences (referring to prac-
tical rather than ideological considerations) or an actor’s methods (synonymously with
such words as “instrumental”, “useful”, “expedient”). Accordingly, one can observe com-
monalities and differences between the foreign policy of Kazakhstan and those of other
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states which researchers also describe as “pragmatic”. Unlike “pragmatic” Uzbekistan (Say-
fullayev, 2016) and Azerbaijan (Makili-Aliyev, 2013), both of which carry out isolationist
policies so as not to fall into the orbit of any big player, Kazakhstan, contrariwise, endeav-
ours to open up to the world, actively participating in international organisations and inte-
gration groups. While Tashkent has U-turned its foreign policy orientation at least twice
in the two recent decades, Astana tries to conduct a steady and predictable foreign policy.
Unlike Qatar, whose foreign policy Khatib (2013) describes as pragmatic in the sense that
it rests on short-term needs and contains incoherences, Kazakhstani foreign policy, con-
trariwise, is driven by long-term interests and involves considerable planning. Similarly to
the pragmatism of Indian foreign policy—meaning “a rejection of . . . ‘idealism’ or ‘moral
posturing’ and, instead, a focus on power and material interests” (Miller and De Estrada,
2017: p. 27)—Nazarbayev, while not overriding ideology completely, uses it not to derive
his decisions from it, but, rather, to support what he wants to do on the basis of material
interests. Such seems identical to what Khan (2014: p. 1) refers to as Obama’s “liberal
pragmatism” which was grounded in the “understanding the realities of the situation and
making decisions based on thorough research of these realities”.
This is not to say that Kazakhstan’s relations with the EU are completely unrelated to
its identity: having friendly relations with the bloc corresponds to its self-portrayal as a
Eurasian state and a bridge between the West and the East. On this point, however,
noteworthy is that the notion of a bridge can be found in the official discourses of
many states, each of which, again, uses it in a particular way: while the Serbian elite
utilise it to balance the instrumental and identity-based foreign policy needs (Patalakh,
2018) and the Putin regime exploits it to dissociate itself from the West and justify
Russia’s “great power” status amidst the decline of its influence after the Soviet Union’s
collapse (Svarin, 2016), Astana applies it preponderantly for the purposes of domestic
modernisation, to justify its close collaboration with multiple actors with the aim to
capitalise on their competitive advantages. A number of studies maintain that in
Central Asia, Kazakhstan possesses the strongest European identity (e.g. Engvall and
Cornell, 2015: p. 57), one of the manifestations of which is that its elite openly criticise
the legacy the Soviet Union left in their country (Jarosiewicz, 2016: p. 40).21 The idea
of Kazakhstan having a European identity, however, should be considered with a reser-
vation, since Kazakhstan hardly falls into the group of post-Soviet states whose strong
and wide-ranging self-identification with Europe is coupled with their rejection of
Russia which they deem as a barbaric, uncivilised state.22 In Kazakhstan’s case, friendship
with the EU, even though fervently desired, appears to be simply instrumental to the
dominant official narrative of the country striving to be progressive and modern—mostly
in the economic and technological areas—and therefore, is limited to these areas. Hence,
for Astana, collaborating with Brussels per se seems to have little to do with self-
identification and is largely delinked from the Kazakhstani elite’s emotional perception of
the EU as well as other actors. Concurrently, it is connected to their conception of the
bloc’s strengths relative to other actors—again, primarily in the areas that interest them.
Yet, one may wonder whether this state of motives is stable and whether it is possible
that in the mid or long term, Kazakhstan, identically to Russia, will end up having a
strong anti-Western identity, all the more so because analogies between present-day
Kazakhstan and Russia during Putin’s first two presidential terms are often cited (e.g.
ibid.: p. 23). From the viewpoint of domestic factors, such seems unlikely, since the
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Kazakh society lacks the imperial ambitions which are deeply rooted in Russians,
making Putin’s anti-Westernism especially effective. Yet, the foreign policy of
Kazakhstan, similarly to those of other post-Soviet autocracies, largely hinges on the
ideational beliefs of the incumbent leader, due to which some states (e.g. Belarus) are
or were engaged in a long-term confrontation with the West with no imperial ambi-
tions. From this perspective, since Nazarbayev has concentrated all power in his own
hands and has yet to nominate a successor, which researchers consider to be one of his
main drawbacks (e.g. ibid.: p. 6), it is barely possible to foresee whether Kazakhstan’s
next leader will share Nazarbayev’s foreign policy beliefs.23
For Brussels’ power over Astana, the current configuration of Kazakhstan’s motives
represents both opportunities and limitations. For example, one may assume that the
Nazarbayev regime will undertake more profound democratisation if the occurrence of
certain changes in external or internal factors enhances the bloc’s instrumental value
for and, consequently, its leverage over Astana. In this respect, one may draw a parallel
with the West’s efforts to push for transparency in Kazakhstan which had been largely
fruitless until 2014–2016, when a worsening economic situation induced the country’s
government to initiate major institutional reforms in that regard (Öge, 2017). Likewise,
Nazarbayev’s enthusiastic push for rapprochement with the bloc in 2009–2010 was
arguably associated with negative consequences of the 2008 financial crisis for
Kazakhstan (Kurmanguzhin, 2016: p. 111). The opposite tendency also seems to be at
play. Ospanova et al. (2017: p. 78), for instance, note that in 2011–2013, the official
framing of the EU in the Kazakhstani media was more negative than before and after,
with the emphasis being put on the bloc’s inability to cope with the Eurozone crisis,
shortage of solidarity and growing social tensions between its members. Approximately
at the same period, as pointed out by Tsertsvadze and Axyonova (2013: p. 1), Kazakhstan’s
interest in the EPCA was seemingly diminishing. Both observations are suspiciously sim-
ultaneous with the EU’s the then arguably increasing demands of a stronger commitment
to democracy (ibid) and the above-mentioned Russia-Kazakhstan rapprochement, related
to the unfolding Arab Spring and the Zhanaozen massacre. Interestingly, since Brussels’
approach toward Astana specifically and Central Asia in general is also substantially deter-
mined by instrumental benefits, shifts in the bloc’s stance toward the region have also
been commonly related to changes in external conditions which augmented the region’s
instrumental value for the EU. For instance, after 9/11, the EU’s (and the West’s in
general) focus toward the region increased because of the incipient international
operation in Afghanistan (Kavalski and Cho, 2017: p. 6).
A number of NGO researchers (Dave, 2007; Fülscher, 2007; Hug and Zhang, 2010;
Tsertsvadze and Axyonova, 2013; Boostra and Tsertsvadze, 2016) and academic
scholars (Konopelko, 2017) suggest the EU take a harsher stance on democracy and
human rights promotion in Kazakhstan, which generally seems somewhat idealistic,24
given that they all concomitantly note that Brussels can hardly use its conditionality if
there is no membership opportunity for Kazakhstan. Those scholars fairly point to the
fact that the bloc has some leverage over Astana, which stems from the fact that
Kazakhstan cares about its international image (Hug, 2009: p. 16),25 is afraid to be com-
pletely locked into the EAEU and is economically connected too closely to the EU
(Boostra and Tsertsvadze, 2016: p. 8). Thus far, however, Nazarbayev’s regime seems to
have generally succeeded in mitigating it even when and where Brussels was in a
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stronger position. For example, even though NGOs commonly advised the bloc to use
its leverage in the talks over EPCA (e.g. Tsertsvadze and Axyonova, 2013: p. 2), Astana
eventually managed to get the long-hoped-for agreement with only cosmetic political
reforms. What seems to limit the EU’s power over Astana is not only the skilfulness of
Nazarbayev’s diplomacy and the bloc’s interest in Kazakhstan as an energy partner, but
also the fact that Astana’s multi-vectorness leaves it options to manoeuvre, a factor due
to which Brussels tends not to exert too much pressure on Astana not to induce it to
exchange its partnership with the bloc for closer friendship with Russia and China
(Fülscher, 2007: p. 3; Bossuyt and Kubicek, 2015: p. 183). Also, some authors (e.g. Hug
and Zhang, 2010: p. 10) advise the Western states to take cognizance of the fact that
the time window when they have a comparative advantage in technology is gradually
closing, so their leverage over Kazakhstan is progressively waning. This argument,
nonetheless, appears questionable at least for two reasons. First, some studies show that
though the economies of a number of developing states are growing fast, developed
Western states are still likely to have far better GDPs per capita and life standards by
2050 (e.g. PWC, 2015). Second, scholars commonly argue that thanks to democracy,
freedoms and liberal values, the West has the environment ensuring its long-term com-
petitive advantage in research, science and innovations (e.g. Cox, 2012).
Endnotes
1The Enhanced Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (EPCA), concluded in
December 2015 to replace the 1999 EU-Kazakhstani Partnership and Cooperation
Agreement (PCA).
2For instance, as McGlinchey (2013) shows, despite the violent breaking of a workers’
strike in the city of Zhanaozen in 2011 (the so-called the Zhanaozen massacre), the
Nazarbayev regime generally treated with understanding and recognised the legitimacy
of protesters’ demands in similar occurrences henceforth. This compares Uzbekistan’s
autocratic leader Islam Karimov who used the 2005 Andijan protests to consolidate his
regime, presenting the demonstrators as Islamic radicals and himself as the sole force
capable of protecting the country from them.
3Those who regard Nazarbayev’s participation in the EAEU to be political may dis-
miss the long-term-economic-benefits argument as cheap talk, citing the organisation’s
poor record as well as the fact that although Russia and Kazakhstan share their longest
borders with one another, Moscow is Astana’s only third largest trade partner. Yet,
orientation toward long-term results seems to be a common line in Nazarbayev’s presi-
dential style, largely manifesting itself in his annual presidential addresses (for details,
see Ambrosio and Lange, 2014), Eurasianist ideology (for details, see Mostafa, 2013) as
well as the Kazakhstan-2030 and Kazakhstan-2050 developmental strategies. Moreover,
the inclination to long-dated goals is also evident in his foreign policy moves. For
instance, such is the case with Kazakhstan’s recent accession to WTO, of which
Nazarbayev had been an active proponent, though it will hardly give his country any
short-term gains given that, as Anceschi (2014: p. 5) notes, “[there are] limited benefits
that full WTO membership could bring to a recourse-based economy”.
4There are also domestic goals for the use of this ideology (for details, see Mostafa,
2013: p. 166).
Patalakh Asian Journal of German and European Studies  (2018) 3:4 Page 17 of 23
5For the same reason, wrong seem those authors who argue that Kazakhstan would love
to enhance its cooperation with the West, though its geographical location limits such
aspirations: Ambrosio & Lange (2014: p. 549), for instance, state that “the full extent to
which this foreign policy is truly multi-vectored is limited by Kazakhstan’s geographical
realities: its immediate neighbourhood is obviously more consequential than those farther
afield, which means that true multi-vectorness is restricted by the precedence that
relations with Russia and China take over relations with the United States and Europe”.
6Jarosiewicz (2016: p. 30) views it as a paradox that Kazakhstan turns to the West for
advise on development, though it is commonly considered as one of the most
committed friends of Russia.
7Western commentators, however, tend to heavily criticise this cooperation (e.g.
Mendick, 2016), in particular, because Blair was noted for providing Nazarbayev with PR
recommendations on how to cope with the reputation consequences of the Zhanaozen
massacre.
8According to Dzhuraev (2012: p. 2), autocracies frequently point to the arguably
important role they play in world debates and international organisations so as to
gain domestic legitimacy. Moreover, as argued by Schatz (2006), resorts to foreign
policy as a strategy of domestic legitimation are especially common where and
when authoritarian regimes have a shortage of internal sources of legitimacy. Albeit
this is not exactly Kazakhstan’s case in general, given that Nazarbayev can always
point to the relative success of his economic reforms, one can still argue inter-
national sources of legitimacy came in handy for him, for instance, during the
2014–2015 dramatic depreciation of the Tenge, Kazakhstan’s national currency.
Interestingly, in his comparative study on the foreign policies of Kazakhstan and
Uzbekistan on the one hand and Kyrgyzstan on the other, McGlinchey (2012) came
to the conclusion that sometimes autocratic leaders may be more supportive of the
West than democratic ones, which happens exactly because of the formers’ need
for an additional source of gaining domestic legitimacy.
9Though that particular proposition has never been implemented, it was consistent
with the overall spirit of Nazarbayev’s rule, which provides for taking highly revolution-
ary, sometimes overtly radical, steps. Among such, one can remember the 1998 transfer
of the national capital to Astana, the 2017 decree on the Kazakh language’s transition
to a Latin-based script, the call to gradually establish a so-called “trinity of languages”
which will transit to English all national education starting from the penultimate year
of high school (Nazarbayev, 2017) as well as the 1993 initiation of the Bolashak
program providing talented Kazakhstanis an opportunity to study in the leading
international—predominantly Western—universities with a state scholarship if they
later work in Kazakhstan for at least five years.
10Naturally, my use of the conjunction “and” in this sentence should not be regarded
as if the two purposes are very separate from each other, for, as theory suggests, nation
branding may be helpful both for strengthening the country’s economy and, indirectly,
consolidating the ruling regime. As one description of potential gains from nation
branding argues (de Chernatony, 2008: p. 17), “in addition to the key goals of attracting
tourists, stimulating inward investment and boosting exports, nation branding can also
increase currency stability; help restore international credibility and investor confi-
dence; reverse international ratings downgrades; increase international political
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influence; stimulate stronger international partnerships and enhance nation building
(by nourishing confidence, pride, harmony, ambition, national resolve)”.
11Incidentally, the academic community seems to replicate a similar approach: in the
author’s observation, Western researchers, even while taking account of its authoritarian
regime, still portray Kazakhstan in a somewhat positive light, which compares with, for
instance, Russia that is usually depicted negatively.
12Interestingly, not only Western powers view Kazakhstan as a potentially good
mediator: in late 2016, for instance, Russia, Turkey and Iran backed for holding peace
talks between the Syrian government and opposition in Astana, seven rounds of which
the city hosted in 2017 (see Mühlberger, 2017 for details).
13Notably, the fact that anti-Westernism and strong unacceptance of the West’s
criticism is present in Putin’s and absent in Nazarbayev’s foreign policies across various
instances correlates well with their approaches to domestic protests: while Putin is
known for never conceding at any price, Nazarbayev is more attentive to public opinion
(Jarosiewicz, 2016: p. 29). This may refer to the psychological complexes, such as
narcissism and bullyism, intrinsic in Putin’s personality (for details, see Forsberg and
Pursiainen, 2017: pp. 14–19) and apparently absent in Nazarbayev’s.
14Remarkably, to understand EU policy toward Kazakhstan, considering the bloc’s
approach to Central Asia as a whole seems important, because, even though the 2007 EU
Strategy for Central Asia underlines the significance of treating each Central Asian state
individually (Council of the EU, 2007: p. 6) and moreover, as I stated above, the EU is
argued to conditionally discriminate between the region’s “potentially promising pupils”
and “problematic cases” (Kavalski and Cho, 2017: p. 6), allocating 70% of its aid through
bilateral instead of region-wide programs (ibid: p. 9), the discourse analysis of the media
shows that European officials tend to relate EU ties with Kazakhstan to the bloc’s overall
policy toward the region. As Ospanova et al. (2017: p. 79) put it, “[a]lthough Europeans
recognize closer relations with Kazakhstan compared to its neighbors, they do not treat
Astana as a privileged partner in the region”, noting that the Kazakhstani elites, by con-
trast, willingly emphasise every accomplishment of their country in its ties with the EU.
15This does not mean EU members are equally interested in and contributing to col-
laboration with Central Asia: pointing to the fact that the 2007 Strategy was primarily
authored by Germany and adopted during its presidency, scholars extensively contend
the document somewhat portrays German interests in the region as common EU ones
(Laumullin, 2011: p. 31; Voloshin, 2014: p. 43). Moreover, Kavalski and Cho (2017: p. 9)
note Germany’s successors have arguably been less prone to continuing Germany’s active
stance on Central Asia.
16Again, this is not to say that all EU members share the same perception of the
bloc’s democracy promotion priorities: Bossuyt (2016), for instance, shows that Poland’s
relative passivity in Central Asia is balanced by its active engagement in democracy
promotion in the Eastern Partnership states.
17Interestingly, the EU, in turn, tends to play the role of a scapegoat for its member
countries which refrain from criticising Kazakhstan, trying to make Brussels do this
“dirty job” instead (Bossuyt and Kubicek 2015: p. 184).
18Remarkably, in view of the bloc’s desire to lessen Russia’s energy influence, the 2007
Strategy considers the development of infrastructure in the North-South direction and
pipeline diversification as European security issues (Council of the EU, 2007).
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19Again, this point should not be interpreted as though all EU members and institu-
tions share the same attitude. The European Parliament, for instance, is traditionally
stronger committed to democracy and human rights, criticising Astana more than the
other EU bodies (Tsertsvadze and Axyonova, 2013: p. 3; Kembayev, 2016: pp. 189–190).
A similar situation is in OSCE, where the US and the UK, driven by political and
ideological rather than economic considerations, used to strongly oppose Kazakhstan’s
2010 chairmanship, while the position of Germany and Germany-led EU members was
far more moderate (Fülscher, 2007: p. 2).
20Notably, my argument is that Astana pursues a pragmatic policy toward the EU for
real, which, in fact, may be different from merely talking about pragmatism. Interest-
ingly, in Kazakhstan’s case, pragmatism—however ironical it may seem—seems to have
become part of the country’s foreign policy ideology: the notion of pragmatism appears
to have penetrated into the country’s official discourse so profoundly that few, if any,
official speeches and documents fail to mention it. It is illustrative that Kazakhstan’s
Foreign Policy Concept (Embassy of Kazakhstan in Armenia, 2017) makes six mentions
of the word “pragmatism” and its derivatives, while Russia’s Concept (MFA of Russia,
2016), which is 2.5 times longer, mentions this word only once.
21This makes him different from other Central Asian leaders, in particular, Kyrgyz
President Almazbek Atambayev who is notorious for regretting about the Soviet
Union’s collapse (Regnum, 2012).
22Such is, for instance, the case with Georgia (Kakachia and Minesashvili, 2015) and
the Baltics (Berg and Ehin, 2009).
23On this point, an analogy can be drawn with Uzbekistan: after the death of its long-
standing dictator Islam Karimov in September 2016, commentators commonly argued
the victory of former Prime Minister Shavkat Mirziyoyev would imply the regime’s
toughening. However, contrary to such expectations, Mirziyoyev proved himself to be
rather a reformist in the first year of his presidency, albeit the sincerity of his moves
remains open to interpretation (Abdurasulov, 2017).
24Especially implausible seem the accounts arguing human rights should be at the
core of the bloc’s attention: Boostra & Tsertsvadze (2016: 7), for example, suggest that
“[a]lthough the EU has little influence in Central Asia, adherence to democratic
principles should be the centrepiece of engagement”.
25Yet, some of these accounts seem to push this argument too far, idealising
azarbayev’s intentions and neglecting the fact that no matter how much Nazarbayev
cares about Kazakhstan’s image and modernisation, staying in power is ultimately more
important for him. A good instance of such an account is Tsertsvadze and Axyonova’s
suggestion that “[a] clear EU stance on Kazakhstan’s democratic and human rights
commitments would be mutually beneficial: political stability rooted in democratic
principles would strengthen the country’s profile on the global stage, while the EU
would gain a more reliable partner” (2013: 2).
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